アジア太平洋地域の宇宙軍能力構造

世界各地で緊張が高まり、紛争地域が拡大する中、軍事宇宙能力は脅威を予測し、危機に対応し、戦力を投影するために拡大し、国益に不可欠な攻撃・防衛戦略の開発を導いてきました。

当レポートでは、中国、インド、オーストラリア、日本、韓国の宇宙軍能力を調査し、産業の促進因子・抑制因子、参入事業者にとっても成長機会の分析などをまとめています。

目次

戦略的必須要件

• 成長課題
• The Strategic Imperative 8（TM）
• 戦略的必須要件トップ3の影響
• GrowthPipelineEngine (TM) を推進する成長機会

成長機会の分析

• 脅威の評価：キネティックフィジカルおよび非キネティックフィジカル
• 脅威の評価：エレクトロニクスおよびサイバー
• 中国：技術能力評価
• 中国：製造能力評価
• 中国：有人宇宙飛行とシスルナオペレーション
• 中国：宇宙打ち上げ能力
• インド：技術能力評価
• インド：製造能力評価
• インド：有人宇宙飛行とシスルナオペレーション
• インド：宇宙打ち上げ能力
• オーストラリア：技術能力評価
• オーストラリア：製造能力評価
• オーストラリア：宇宙打ち上げ能力
• 日本：技術能力評価
• 日本：製造能力評価
• 日本：有人宇宙飛行とシスルナオペレーション
• 日本：宇宙打ち上げ能力
• 韓国：技術能力評価
• 韓国：製造能力評価
• 韓国：有人宇宙飛行とシスルナオペレーション
• 韓国：宇宙打ち上げ能力
• 促進要因
• 促進要因分析
• 成長抑制
• 成長抑制分析

宇宙軍能力構造：アジア太平洋

• 成長機会1：先進サイバーおよび電子戦能力
• 成長機会2：マルチドメイン陸軍コンセプト
• 成長機会3：地上プラットフォームの進歩
• 図表リスト
• 免責事項

Multi-domain Army Concepts, Dual-use Technologies, and Cyber-resilience Framework to Drive Future Technology Strategy

This study provides an overview of the space force capacity structure of the Asia-Pacific. With an increase in tensions and conflict zones across the globe, military space capabilities have expanded to anticipate threats, respond to crises, and project power, guiding the development of offensive and defensive strategies vital to national interests. The changing space environment has highlighted the role of space as a distinct warfighting domain representing disparate theories and strategies pertaining to space power.

Russia and China's positions on space are evolving to encompass information-driven capabilities as a pre-requisite to non-contact warfare, targeting assets and critical infrastructure to deprive the adversary of space-enabled information without geographically engaging in the physical theater of conflict. The national security space postures of most countries in the Asia-Pacific, however, focus on deterring and countering threats from space that infringe on national, allied, and partner interests. These differences in military postures and capabilities have the potential to expose systemic cracks.

With space becoming inextricably linked to crisis stability, major powers have begun developing counter-space capabilities to degrade and deter adversary spheres of influence. Strategic stability and deterrence postures are virtually non-existent in the space domain due to the lack of human casualties and first-strike instability, increasing the risk of escalation of terrestrial conflicts and disturbance of nuclear stability.

The 1967 United Nations treaty signed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to regulate the use of space and provide a framework for international space law failed to address anti-satellite weapons, the weaponization of space, resource utilization in the context of cislunar operations, and space debris deposition. As a result, major powers continue to develop kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, exploiting grey areas in the treaty to conduct military operations in space.

The study focuses on China, India, Australia, Japan, and South Korea in terms of space force capabilities. It identifies the factors driving and restraining the industry in the region as well as the growth opportunities arising from the emerging changes that market players can leverage.

Table of Contents

Strategic Imperatives

• Why is it Increasingly Difficult to Grow?
• The Strategic Imperative 8™
• The Impact of the Top 3 Strategic Imperatives on the Asia-Pacific Space Force Capability Structure
• Growth Opportunities Fuel the Growth Pipeline Engine™

Growth Opportunity Analysis

• Threat Assessment: Kinetic Physical and Non-kinetic Physical
• Threat Assessment: Electronic and Cyber
• China: Technology Capability Assessment
• China: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• China: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• China: Manufacturing Capability Assessment
• China: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations
• China: Manned Spaceflight & Cislunar Operations (continued)
• China: Space Launch Capability
• China: Space Launch Capability (continued)
• China: Space Launch Capability (continued)
• India: Technology Capability Assessment
• India: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• India: Manufacturing Capability Assessment
• India: Manufacturing Capability Assessment (continued)
• India: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations
• India: Space Launch Capability
• Australia: Technology Capability Assessment
• Australia: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• Australia: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• Australia: Manufacturing Capability Assessment
• Australia: Manufacturing Capability Assessment (continued)
• Australia: Space Launch Capability
• Japan: Technology Capability Assessment
• Japan: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• Japan: Manufacturing Capability Assessment
• Japan: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations
• Japan: Manned Spaceflight & Cislunar Operations (continued)
• Japan: Manned Spaceflight & Cislunar Operations (continued)
• Japan: Space Launch Capability
• South Korea: Technology Capability Assessment
• South Korea: Technology Capability Assessment (continued)
• South Korea: Manufacturing Capability Assessment
• South Korea: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations
• South Korea: Space Launch Capability
• Growth Drivers
• Growth Driver Analysis
• Growth Driver Analysis (continued)
• Growth Driver Analysis (continued)
• Growth Driver Analysis (continued)
• Growth Restraints
• Growth Restraint Analysis
• Growth Restraint Analysis (continued)
• Growth Restraint Analysis (continued)

Space Force Capability Structure-Asia Pacific (APAC)

• Growth Opportunity 1: Advanced Cyber and Electronic Warfare Capabilities
• Growth Opportunity 1: Advanced Cyber and Electronic Warfare Capabilities (continued)
• Growth Opportunity 2: Multi-domain Army Concepts
• Growth Opportunity 2: Multi-domain Army Concepts (continued)
• Growth Opportunity 3: Terrestrial Platform Advances
• Growth Opportunity 3: Terrestrial Platform Advances (continued)
• List of Exhibits
• Legal Disclaimer